Becoming Unconventional: Correcting the \u27Particular Social Group\u27 Ground for Asylum by Marouf, Fatma
NORTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW
Volume 44 | Number 3 Article 5
Summer 2019
Becoming Unconventional: Correcting the
'Particular Social Group' Ground for Asylum
Fatma Marouf
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncilj
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina
Journal of International Law by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Fatma Marouf, Becoming Unconventional: Correcting the 'Particular Social Group' Ground for Asylum, 44 N.C. J. Int'l L. & Com. Reg.
489 (2019).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncilj/vol44/iss3/5
 Becoming Unconventional: Constricting the ‘Particular Social 
Group’ Ground for Asylum 
Fatma Marouf† 
 
I.  Introduction ............................................................... 487 
II.   The Evolution of the PSG Ground in U.S. Asylum 
Jurisprudence ............................................................. 489 
III.  Recent Developments Constricting the PSG Ground 493 
A. Procedural Constrictions ..................................... 493 
1. Imposing an Exceedingly Strict Pleading 
Standard for PSG Claims ............................... 493 
2. Prohibiting Revision or Clarification of the PSG 
at the Administrative Level ........................... 500 
B. Substantive Constrictions ................................... 506 
1. Restricting Entire Categories of PSG Claims 506 
a. Domestic Violence Related PSG Claims . 506 
b. Family-Related PSG Claims .................... 507 
2. Applying a Heightened Standard for Persecution 
by Non-Governmental Actors ....................... 509 
IV.  Implications of Constricting the PSG Ground ........... 511 
V.  Conclusion ................................................................. 517 
 
I. Introduction 
In order to qualify as a refugee, an asylum seeker must 
demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecution on account of at 
least one of five protected grounds: race, religion, nationality, 
political opinion, or membership in a particular social group 
(“PSG”).1  This definition in the Immigration and Nationality Act 
(“INA”) reflects the international definition of a refugee in the U.N. 
 
† Fatma E. Marouf (B.A., Yale University; J.D., M.P.H., Harvard University) is a 
Professor of Law and Director of the Immigrant Rights Clinic at Texas A&M University 
School of Law. This Article draws on ideas and arguments developed during the federal 
litigation challenging Matter of W-Y-C- & H-O-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 189 (BIA 
2018). Deepest thanks to my co-counsel and amici in that case, including Zachary 
Albun, Jean-Claude Andre, Deborah Anker, Jeffrey Chase, Geoffrey Hoffman, Andrea 
Meza, and Monique Sherman. 
 1 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2014). 
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Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees 
(“Refugee Convention”).2  Among the five grounds, membership in 
a particular social group (“PSG”) has created the most confusion.  
The U.S. Board of Immigration Appeals initially approached 
interpreting the PSG ground in a manner consistent with the other 
four grounds.3  Recent administrative decisions issued under the 
Trump Administration, however, have imposed uniquely strict 
requirements for claims based on the PSG ground, rather than 
striving for consistency across the five grounds.4  This trend 
disproportionately disadvantages women and children asylum 
seekers fleeing violence by private actors who tend to rely on the 
PSG ground.5  In fact, the constrictions of the PSG ground may be 
specifically targeted at curbing asylum claims by women and 
children fleeing Central America.6 
Part I of this Article provides a brief background about the 
evolution of the PSG ground in the United States and how it has 
become increasingly complicated and constricted over time.  Part II 
discusses several ways that recent administrative decisions have 
imposed uniquely strict requirements for PSG-based asylum claims, 
both procedurally and substantively.  Namely, the recent decision 
of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) in Matter of W-Y-C- 
& H-O-B- creates two new procedural restrictions.  First, it imposes 
an exceedingly strict pleading standard in PSG cases by requiring 
“exact delineation” of the PSG.7  Second, Matter of W-Y-C- 
prohibits asylum seekers from revising their PSG in an 
administrative appeal, departing from longstanding practice.8  At 
the same time, the Attorney General’s recent decision in Matter of 
A-B- imposes two significant substantive restrictions.9  It purports 
 
 2 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 
U.N.T.S. 150; Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 
606 U.N.T.S. 267. 
 3 Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (BIA 1985). 
 4 See Rachel Gonzalez Settlage, Rejecting the Children of Violence: Why U.S. 
Asylum Law Should Return to the Acosta Definition of “a Particular Social Group,” 30 
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 287, 287 (2016). 
 5 Id. 
 6 See id. 
 7 Matter of W-Y-C- & H-O-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 189, 191 (BIA 2018). 
 8 Id. 
 9 Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 316 (A.G. 2018). 
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to exclude entire categories of claims from the PSG ground.10  
Additionally, it imposes a heightened legal standard for showing 
persecution by non-governmental actors, which is especially 
common in gender-related cases brought under the PSG ground.11  
Part III explores the significant implications of these recent 
developments. 
II. The Evolution of the PSG Ground in U.S. Asylum 
Jurisprudence 
The BIA first interpreted the PSG ground in 1985 in the seminal 
case Matter of Acosta, which applied the statutory construction 
principle of ejusdem generis to define a PSG consistently with the 
four other protected grounds.12  Reasoning that the other four 
grounds for asylum (race, nationality, religion, and political 
opinion) all involved an immutable characteristic—something that 
a person cannot or should not have to change because it is 
fundamental to identity—the BIA applied that same definition to 
membership in a PSG.13  For two decades, Acosta’s interpretation 
of a PSG based on an “immutable characteristic” remained 
definitive.  Under Acosta, the BIA recognized many types of PSGs, 
including, but not limited to, those based on sexual orientation, past 
employment, tribe, and family.14 
Beginning in 2006, however, the BIA began to revise the 
definition of a PSG.15  Between 2006 and 2014, the BIA issued eight 
precedent decisions addressing the PSG ground.16  In 2006 and 
2008, the BIA introduced the concepts of “social visibility” and 
 
 10 Id. 
 11 Id. at 317–19. 
 12 Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (BIA 1985). 
 13 Id. at 233–34. 
 14 Id. at 233. 
 15 See Fatma E. Marouf, The Emerging Importance of “Social Visibility” in Defining 
a Particular Social Group and its Potential Impact on Asylum Claims Related to Sexual 
Orientation and Gender, 27 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 47, 63 (2008). 
 16 See Matter of C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 951 (BIA 2006); Matter of A-M-E- & J-
G-U-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 69, 69 (BIA 2007); Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 597, 597 (BIA 
2008); Matter of E-A-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 591, 591 (BIA 2008); Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 
I. & N. Dec. 227, 227 (BIA 2014); Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208, 208 (BIA 
2014), aff’d in relevant part sub nom. Garay-Reyes v. Lynch, 842 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 
2016), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 736 (2018); Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 388 
(BIA 2014). 
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“particularity” into the PSG analysis, first as factors and then as 
requirements.17  All the while, the BIA denied that these new 
requirements departed from prior decisions and practice, and 
instead claimed that they had applied the same principles.18  
Because the BIA failed to explain clearly what it meant by the terms 
“social visibility” and “particularity,” much confusion resulted and 
the new requirements were challenged in the appellate courts.  In 
2009 and 2011 respectively, the Seventh and Third Circuits rejected 
them as unreasonable under a Chevron analysis.19 
Eventually, in 2014, the BIA issued two precedent decisions, 
Matter of M-E-V-G- and Matter of W-G-R-, attempting to clarify the 
new requirements.20  These decisions renamed “social visibility” as 
“social distinction,” explaining that ocular visibility was not 
required.21  Rather, the group has to be seen as distinct by the rest 
of society.22  The BIA also explained that “particularity” referred to 
whether the group in question has clear boundaries, so that one can 
determine if someone is in or out of the group.23  While the Third 
Circuit ultimately accepted the “social distinction” and 
“particularity” requirements in 2018, those elements have not been 
applied in the Seventh Circuit.24 
Despite the BIA’s efforts to clarify the meanings of social 
distinction and particularity, they remain confusing even for 
 
 17 Matter of C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 951 (BIA 2006); Matter of A-M-E- & J-G-
U-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 69, 69 (BIA 2007); Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 579 (BIA 
2008); Matter of E-A-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 591, 591 (BIA 2008). 
 18 Some circuit courts accepted the BIA’s position. See, e.g., Hernandez de la Cruz 
v. Lynch, 819 F.3d 784, 786–87 n.1 (5th Cir. 2016) (stating that Board’s decision in M-E-
V-G- clarified but did not depart from principles in prior cases). 
 19 See Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611, 611 (7th Cir. 2009); Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. 
Att’y Gen. of U.S., 663 F.3d 582, 582 (3d Cir. 2011). In 2018, the Third Circuit ultimately 
accepted the particularity and social distinction requirements after the BIA’s clarifications. 
See S.E.R.L. v. Att’y Gen., 894 F.3d 535, 535 (3d Cir. 2018). 
 20 Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 227 (BIA 2014); Matter of W-G-R-, 26 
I. & N. Dec. 208, 208 (BIA 2014), aff’d in relevant part sub nom; Garay-Reyes v. Lynch, 
842 F.3d 1125, 1125 (9th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 736 (2018). 
 21 Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 227; Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 
208. 
 22 Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 238. 
 23 Id. at 239. 
 24 See Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d at 611. In 2018, the Third Circuit ultimately 
accepted the particularity and social distinction requirements after the BIA’s clarifications. 
See S.E.R.L. v. Att’y Gen., 894 F.3d at 535. 
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attorneys and are almost impossible for unrepresented asylum 
seekers to understand.25  One reason for the persistent confusion is 
that the BIA’s various explanations have been contradictory.  For 
example, the BIA has defined “particularity” to mean that a group 
has “definable boundaries,” but it has also rejected groups with clear 
boundaries on the basis that the group is too broad.26  Similarly, the 
BIA held that social distinction is based on the view of society as a 
whole, but in maintaining that previously recognized PSGs satisfied 
this standard, it relied on the perspective of the persecutors.27  
Former Attorney General Sessions added to this confusion in Matter 
of A-B-, by rejecting the BIA’s analysis of particularity and social 
distinction in Matter of A-R-C-G-.28  In A-B-, Sessions stated that 
even if “each term [in the PSG] has a commonly understood 
definition,” that “does not establish that these terms have the 
requisite particularity in identifying a distinct social group.”29  
However, the Attorney General failed to explain what would 
provide a clear benchmark for who falls within the group. 
Additionally, the difference between “social distinction” and 
“particularity” remains unclear.  In Valdiviezo-Galdamez, the Third 
Circuit noted that it was “hard-pressed to discern any difference” 
between the requirements.30  Part of the confusion is that the BIA 
and Attorney General have defined both factors by referencing 
societal perceptions of discreteness and distinction.31  The two 
 
 25 Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 241 (acknowledging that the social 
distinction and particularity requirements may overlap); Rios v. Lynch, 807 F.3d 1123, 
1126 (9th Cir. 2015) (describing membership in a particular social group as “an enigmatic 
and difficult-to-define term”); Rivera-Barrientos v. Holder, 666 F.3d 641, 647 (10th Cir. 
2012) (noting “the evolving boundaries of social group membership”); see also DEBORAH 
ANKER, LAW OF ASYLUM §5:40–43 (Thompson Reuters ed., 2018). 
 26 See, e.g., Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 221 (finding that the proposed 
group of “former members of the Mara 18 gang in El Salvador who have renounced their 
gang membership” was not particular because it “could include persons of any age, sex, or 
background”); Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 239 (stating that a PSG must not be 
“overbroad”). 
 27 Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 218–19. 
 28 Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 335–36 (A.G. 2018) (overruling Matter of 
A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388 (BIA 2014). 
 29 Id. at 335. 
 30 Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 663 F.3d 582, 604 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 31 See Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 216; Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 
335 (reasoning that social groups based on resistance to gang violence likely lack 
particularity because they “possess no distinguishing characteristic or concrete trait that 
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requirements also often conflict with each other, such that satisfying 
one undermines the other.  The Attorney General acknowledged this 
tension in Matter of A-B-, stating that “[PSG] definitions that seek 
to avoid particularity issues by defining a narrow class . . . will often 
lack sufficient social distinction to be cognizable as a distinct social 
group, rather than a description of individuals sharing certain traits 
or experiences.”32  Thus, asylum seekers are often trapped between 
trying to avoid a PSG that is “too broad to have definable 
boundaries” and one that is “too narrow to have larger significance 
in society.”33 
The social distinction and particularity requirements not only 
create a bewildering legal standard but also impose an incredibly 
high evidentiary burden.  Satisfying these requirements generally 
requires submitting voluminous country conditions documents, 
which unrepresented detainees cannot obtain.  In addition, expert 
testimony is often required.  Many detainees cannot afford counsel, 
much less have the wherewithal for an expert to testify on their 
behalf. 
It also remains unclear what type of evidence actually 
establishes the requirements.  In Matter of A-R-C-G-, the BIA relied 
on country conditions evidence that Guatemala has a “culture of 
machismo and family violence,” and that police often fail to respond 
to requests for assistance related to domestic violence.  Based on 
this, the BIA found that the group defined as “married women who 
are unable to leave the relationship” is socially distinct.34  However, 
former Attorney General Sessions found that same evidence 
inadequate in Matter of A-B-.35  Without explaining what type of 
evidence would establish social distinction, Sessions speculated that 
each victim of domestic violence is viewed “as a victim of a 
particular abuser in highly individualized circumstances” rather 
than as any type of group.36  This leaves asylum seekers with little 
practical guidance about how to establish that a group satisfies the 
particularity and social distinction requirements. 
 
would identify them as members of such a group,” which sounds more like an analysis of 
social distinction). 
 32 Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 336. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 394. 
 35 Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 336. 
 36 Id. 
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III. Recent Developments Constricting the PSG Ground 
The recent decision in Matter of W-Y-C- imposes two new 
procedural restrictions on the PSG ground, while Matter of A-B- 
creates two new substantive restrictions.  As discussed below, 
Matter of W-Y-C- imposes an extremely high pleading standard 
unlike any other by requiring an “exact delineation” of the PSG.  At 
the same time, it prohibits applicants from revising the definition of 
PSG at the administrative level.  Meanwhile, Matter of A-B- 
purports to restrict entire categories of PSG-based asylum claims, 
while also imposing a higher legal standard for persecution by non-
governmental actors. 
A. Procedural Constrictions 
1. Imposing an Exceedingly Strict Pleading Standard for 
PSG Claims 
Pleading rules are supposed to play a “gatekeeping” function by 
allowing courts to get rid of meritless cases quickly, thereby 
reducing litigation costs and promoting judicial efficiency.37  If a 
pleading standard is too strict, however, it may also exclude cases 
with merit before relevant information can come to light.  
Furthermore, at least one empirical study has found that heightened 
pleading standards do not actually do a better job of filtering out 
meritless lawsuits.38 
The BIA’s decision in Matter of W-Y-C- imposes an extremely 
strict pleading standard.  It singles out asylum cases based on the 
PSG ground as an area where the litigant must provide an “exact 
delineation” of a claim to avoid waiver.39  This “exact delineation” 
standard is not applied in any other area of law, or to any other type 
of asylum case.40  Asylum seekers whose cases are based on religion 
or political opinion are not required to provide an “exact 
 
 37 Alexander A. Reinert, The Costs of Heightened Pleading, 86 INDIAN L.J. 119, 123–
24 (2011). 
 38 Id. at 125–26 (finding that the heightened “plausibility” pleading standard does 
not do better than the notice pleading standard for filtering out meritless claims in federal 
civil litigation). 
 39 Matter of W-Y-C- & H-O-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 189, 191 (BIA 2018). 
 40 See note 42 below and accompanying text (explaining that courts traditionally 
require a litigant to “adequately raise” an issue, not provide an “exact delineation”).  
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delineation” of their claim.41 
The traditional legal standard to avoid waiver of a claim is that 
the litigant must “adequately raise” an issue below.  This is true even 
in the Fifth Circuit where W-Y-C- arose.  For example, the Fifth 
Circuit has explained, “For this court to have jurisdiction over an 
issue that the BIA has adequate means of addressing, a petitioner 
must adequately raise that issue before the BIA.”42  In Eduard v. 
Ashcroft, the Fifth Circuit found that a petitioner had “adequately 
raised” a claim under the Convention Against Torture even though 
he never explicitly stated that he was applying for that form of relief 
and did not check the box for it on the application form.43  Similarly, 
in Hongyok v. Gonzales, the court allowed the petitioner to present 
a PSG that did not “significantly differ” from the one presented to 
the Board, reasoning that she had “adequately presented” her 
proposed ground for relief to the agency.44  Requiring an asylum 
seeker to provide an “exact delineation” of a PSG is a much stricter 
standard than simply requiring the applicant to “adequately raise” 
the claim.  In other contexts, federal courts have also applied the 
“adequately raise” standard for preserving a claim.45  Indeed, in no 
area of law is “exact delineation” the pleading standard. 
The rigidity of the “exact delineation” requirement is also at 
odds with congressional intent.  The INA makes it clear that asylum 
is not supposed to be an exclusionary process by giving immigration 
 
 41 Matter of W-Y-C- applies only to the PSG ground, and no other cases mention 
“exact delineation” as a standard in asylum cases.  
 42 Omari v. Holder, 562 F.3d 314, 424 (5th Cir. 2009) (emphasis added); see also 
Calix v. Lynch, 784 F.3d 1000, 1003 (5th Cir. 2015) (finding that the petitioner had 
“adequately raised” the argument that his conviction did not trigger the stop-time rule for 
cancellation of removal); see also Lucio-Rayos v. Sessions, 875 F.3d 573, 577 n.6 (10th 
Cir. 2017) (declining to address an argument that the petitioner “did not adequately raise 
to the BIA”); Garcia-Gonzalez v. Holder, 737 F.3d 498, 501 n.3 (8th Cir. 2013) (“An alien 
has not adequately raised an issue before the BIA if he does not address it in his briefing 
before the BIA.”). 
 43 Eduard v. Ashcroft, 379 F.3d 182, 195 (5th Cir. 2004). 
 44 Hongyok v. Gonzales, 492 F.3d 547, 550 (5th Cir. 2007) (emphasis added). 
 45 See, e.g., United States v. Garza, 70 F. App’x 212, 213 (5th Cir. 2003) (“Because 
Garza did not adequately raise the issue of whether the activation of the overhead lights 
on the Border Patrol vehicle after Garza stopped his vehicle constituted a seizure in his 
motion to suppress before the district court, he has waived this argument”) (emphasis 
added); Cupit v. Whitley, 28 F.3d 532, 535 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding, in a habeas case, that 
the procedural default and exhaustion doctrine objections were waived, because the 
petitioner “did indeed adequately raise his hearsay arguments through his state court 
proceedings”) (emphasis added). 
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judges (“IJs”) an affirmative obligation to develop the record.46  
Likewise, the regulations require IJs to advise noncitizens about 
their “apparent eligibility” to apply for any benefits in the INA.47  
The new “exact delineation” standard conflicts with this 
collaborative approach.  Courts have found that an IJ’s failure to 
advise a noncitizen of “apparent eligibility” to apply for relief is a 
due process violation.48  Furthermore, the BIA has explained that 
although the burden of proof is ultimately on the respondent, the IJ 
should take an active role in helping the respondent develop her 
legal theory from the facts presented.49 
The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has also 
stressed that “the adjudicator shares the duty to ascertain and 
evaluate all the relevant facts,” noting that “[t]his is achieved, to a 
large extent, by the adjudicator . . . guiding the applicant in 
providing the relevant information.”50  While W-Y-C- assumes that 
every asylum applicant should be able to define her PSG perfectly, 
UNHCR recognizes that “[o]ften the applicant himself may not be 
aware of the reasons for the persecution feared.”51  It is not, 
however, his duty to analyze the case to such an extent as to identify 
 
 46 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(1), 1241(b)(3)(A), 1641(b)(1); see also Sankoh v. 
Mukasey, 539 F.3d 456, 467 (7th Cir. 2008) (“Unlike Article III courts, an immigration 
court is a more inquisitorial tribunal.”). 
 47 8 C.F.R. § 240.11(a)(2). 
 48 See, e.g., United States v. Lopez-Velasquez, 629 F.3d 894, 896–97 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(en banc); Toure v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 443 F.3d 310, 325 (3d Cir. 2006) (“an [immigration 
judge] has a duty to develop an applicant’s testimony, especially regarding an issue that 
she may find dispositive”); Agyeman v. INS, 296 F.3d 871, 877 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he IJ 
must adequately explain the hearing procedures to the alien, including what he must prove 
to establish his basis for relief.”). 
 49 See Matter of S-M-J-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 722, 723–24 (BIA 1997) (recognizing the 
responsibility of the immigration judge to ensure that refugee protection is provided when 
warranted, and specifying that a “cooperative approach” between the immigration judge 
and the applicant is therefore necessary in immigration court); see also Matter of Y-L-, 24 
I. & N. Dec. 151, 161 (BIA 2007) (admonishing the immigration judge for failing to notify 
an asylum applicant of her concerns with the application and providing the applicant with 
an opportunity to respond). 
 50 U.N. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Note on 
Burden and Standard of Proof in Refugee Claims (Dec. 16, 1998). 
 51 UNHCR, HANDBOOK AND GUIDELINES ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR 
DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS, U.N. Doc. HCR/1P/4/ENG/REV.3, 15–16 [hereinafter 
UNCHR HANDBOOK], available at 
https://www.unhcr.org/publications/legal/3d58e13b4/handbook-procedures-criteria-
determining-refugee-status-under-1951-convention.html [https://perma.cc/8CFX-DJGV]. 
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the reasons in detail.”52  According to UNHCR, “it is for the 
examiner, when investigating the facts of the case, to ascertain the 
reason or reasons for the persecution feared and to decide whether 
the definition in the 1951 Convention it met within this respect.”53 
Although the BIA’s decision in W-Y-C- quotes an earlier 
decision, Matter of A-T-, as setting forth the “exact delineation” 
requirement—suggesting that this has been the standard for over a 
decade—the language in A-T- was mere dicta in remand instructions 
and did not set forth a general rule.  In its initial 2007 decision in 
Matter of A-T-, the BIA found that a woman from Mali who had 
suffered female genital mutilation had failed to establish a risk of 
future persecution because there was no chance she would be 
persecuted again by the same procedure.54  The BIA noted that in a 
prior motion to reconsider, the applicant had “presented a much 
broader group in arguing that FGM was only one aspect in the 
lifelong subjugation of women in her culture.”55  The BIA did not 
refuse to consider the group, but instead found that the record in the 
case did not support that claim.56 
The Attorney General vacated that decision in 2008, concluding 
that the BIA had erred in denying the application because the feared 
future persecution could not “take precisely the same form as past 
persecution.”57  The Attorney General instructed the BIA to 
determine whether the past FGM triggered a presumption of a 
continuing threat to the applicant’s life or freedom on account of her 
membership in a particular social group.58  In a footnote, the 
Attorney General remarked, “[i]n most cases of this sort, it would 
be better practice for Immigration Judges and the Board to address 
at the outset whether the applicant has established persecution on 
account of membership in a particular social group, rather than 
assuming it as the Board did here.”59  This language clearly reflects 
 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id.; see also American Courts and the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees: A 
Need for Harmony in the Face of a Refugee Crisis, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1399 (2018) 
(arguing that U.S. courts should defer to UNHCR in interpreting the Refugee Convention). 
 54 Matter of A-T-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 296, 296–97 (BIA 2007). 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Matter of A-T-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 621. 
 58 Id. at 622. 
 59 Id. at 623 n.7. 
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a recommendation, not a rule.  Furthermore, the decision states the 
applicant “must initially identify the particular social group or 
groups in which membership is claimed,” not provide an exact 
delineation of the group.60 
In 2009, after the case was remanded to the BIA, the BIA issued 
another published decision in Matter of A-T-.61  That decision 
provides “[b]ecause the matter was not consistently presented 
below, the DHS requests that on remand the respondent specifically 
delineate the particular social group(s) [to which] she claims to 
belong.”62  DHS requested the respondent to provide other 
information as well, such as whether she was invoking any other 
grounds for asylum, and the identity of her past persecutor.63  In 
instructing the respondent to provide an “exact delineation” of her 
PSG on remand, the Board stressed “this is an issue that has not 
been consistently presented by the respondent in these proceedings, 
and this alone precludes us from resolving her case on the record 
now before us.”64  Thus, the BIA never suggested that all applicants 
relying on the PSG ground should be required to provide an exact 
delineation of the PSG.  Rather, its remand instructions were highly 
specific to the facts and history of the case.  Exact delineation was 
important in A-T- because the agency was trying to determine 
whether the applicant’s “fear of forced marriage [was] on account 
of the same enumerated ground as [her] past persecution.”65  A-T- 
did not establish a general rule requiring all asylum seekers to 
provide an exact delineation of the PSG. 
Recent changes in how IJs are handling cases post W-Y-C- show 
that W-Y-C- is the case that changed the rules, not the BIA’s 2009 
decision in A-T-.  Relying on Matter of W-Y-C, some IJs have been 
issuing orders stylized as “summary judgments” and denying 
asylum early on in the proceedings without even giving the 
applicant an evidentiary hearing, based on the applicant’s failure to 
provide an exact delineation of the PSG.66  As former Immigration 
Judge Jeffrey S. Chase has explained, such “summary denials” are 
 
 60 Id. 
 61 Matter of A-T-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 4, 4 (BIA 2009). 
 62 Id. at 9. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. at 10. 
 65 See id. at 10 n.6. 
 66 Summary judgment forms are on file with author. 
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a predictable by-product of a rule requiring “exact delineation.”67  
There is no evidence of immigration judges pretermitting asylum 
claims based on other protected grounds; only PSG-based asylum 
claims are being denied without an evidentiary hearing or any 
opportunity to testify. 
Decisions issued by former Attorney General Sessions shortly 
before the BIA’s decision in W-Y-C- paved the way for these 
summary dismissals.  In E-F-H-L-, Sessions vacated a Board 
decision recognizing the right to a full asylum hearing.68  Shortly 
thereafter, in Castro-Tum, Sessions stressed the importance of 
expeditious processing.69  Similarly, in Matter of L-A-B-R-, which 
dealt with continuances, Sessions stressed the “efficient 
enforcement of the immigration laws.”70  These decisions all 
prioritize speed in decision-making at the expense of a fair process. 
Immigration judges who are pretermitting PSG-based asylum 
cases without a full hearing may be violating longstanding agency 
requirements and constitutional due process norms.  In a 1989 
decision called Matter of Fefe, the BIA stressed that full 
examination of the applicant is “an essential aspect of the asylum 
adjudication.”71  There, the BIA cited the UNHCR Handbook, 
which recognizes that testimony (a personal interview in the context 
of refugee status determinations), rather than simply written 
materials, is required to properly assess a claim for refugee status.72  
The Supreme Court has recognized that the UNHCR Handbook 
provides “significant guidance in constructing the United Nations 
Protocol . . .  to which Congress sought to conform United States 
refugee law.”73 
 
 67 See Jeffrey S. Chase, Are Summary Denials Coming to Immigration Court?, 
JEFFREYSCHASE.COM (June 24, 2018), 
https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2018/6/24/are-summary-denials-coming-to-
immigration-court [https://perma.cc/FGU8-8TA4]; Jeffrey S. Chase, The Impact of the 
BIA’s Decision in Matter of W-Y-C- & H-O-B-, JEFFREYSCHASE.COM (Jan. 26, 2018), 
https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2018/1/26/0sg8ru1tl0gz4becqimcrtt4ns8yjz 
[https://perma.cc/WH4R-Y88U]. 
 68 Matter of E-F-H-L-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 226, 226 (A.G. 2018). 
 69 See Matter of Castro-Tum, 27 I. & N. Dec. 271, 293 (A.G. 2018); Matter of L-A-
B-R- et al., 27 I. & N. Dec. 405, 406–07 (A.G. 2018). 
 70 See Matter of L-A-B-R- et al., 27 I. & N. at 407. 
 71 Matter of Fefe, 20 I. & N. Dec. 116, 117–18 (BIA 1989). 
 72 Id. at 118 (citing UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 51, at ¶ 199–200. 
 73 INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 439–40 n.22 (1987). 
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When the Supreme Court raised the pleading standard for 
federal civil litigation from “notice” pleading to “plausibility” in 
Iqbal and Twombly, commentators criticized the change for 
foreclosing certain classes of plaintiffs from relief,74 creating 
“disarray,”75 introducing unpredictability into the process of pretrial 
disposition for all types of claims,76 reflecting “procedural judicial 
activism,”77 and violating procedural due process rights by 
imposing a pleading standard that is difficult for laypeople to 
satisfy.78  One commentator claimed that Iqbal “may be one of the 
most infamous and harmful [decisions] to . . . individual rights of 
this generation.”79 
Similar critiques can be made of the new “exact delineation” 
standard for PSG-based asylum claims.  Appellate courts will likely 
soon have to address whether this is an appropriate pleading 
standard, especially as more cases of asylum claims being 
pretermitted without an evidentiary hearing come to light.  Courts 
should reject this new pleading standard as an arbitrary departure 
from precedent that conflicts with all other pleading standards. A 
 
 74 See, e.g., David Marcus, The Past, Present, and Future of Trans-Substantivity in 
Federal Civil Procedure, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 371, 426 (2010); see Alex Reinert, 
Procedural Barriers to Civil Rights Litigation and the Illusory Promise of Equity, 78 
UMKC L. REV. 931, 940–41 (2010). 
 75 Joseph A. Seiner, After Iqbal, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 179, 192 (2010) (“Iqbal 
ha[s] left the requirements for pleading intentional employment-discrimination claims in 
disarray . . . .”). 
 76  See Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing 
Systems, 95 IOWA L. REV. 821, 832 (2010) (criticizing Iqbal for “fix[ing] on a novel and 
unpredictable test”); Erwin Chemerinsky, Closing the Courthouse Doors: Transcript of 
the 2010 Honorable James R. Browning Distinguished Lecture in Law, 71 MONT. L. REV. 
285, 291 (2010) (describing the Iqbal standard as “mean [ing] . . . that it all depends on the 
luck of the draw and who your district judge is”); Lisa Eichhorn, A Sense of 
Disentitlement: Frame-Shifting and Metaphor in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 62 FLA. L. REV. 951, 
953 (2010) (noting “the unbounded discretion that the opinion grants to judges . . . .”). 
 77 See generally Goutam U. Jois, Pearson, Iqbal, and Procedural Judicial Activism, 
37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 901–907 (2010) (addressing problems posed by the Pearson Iqbal 
interaction, specifically and the curtailment of remedy availability in civil litigation). 
 78 Melodee C. Rhodes, The Battle Lines of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) 
and the Effects on a Pro Se Litigant’s Inability to Survive a Motion to Dismiss, 22 ST. 
THOMAS L. REV. 527, 529 (2010) (arguing that under Iqbal, FRCP 8(a)(2) “violates an 
individual’s procedural due process rights by requiring a pleading standard that a 
layperson finds difficult to satisfy”). 
 79 Darwinder S. Sidhu, First Korematsu and Now Ashcroft v. Iqbal: The Latest 
Chapter in the Wartime Supreme Court’s Disregard for Claims of Discrimination, 58 
BUFF. L. REV. 419, 423 (2010). 
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recent Fifth Circuit precedent affirmed the BIA’s decision in Matter 
of W-Y-C-, but a concurring opinion by Judge Dennis rejected the 
“exact delineation” standard as “exacting and unnecessary.”80 
Recognizing that “[d]efining a PSG is unspeakably complex and the 
requirements ever-changing,” Judge Dennis concluded that 
“[s]omeone who faces persecution on account of a protected ground 
is no less deserving of asylum’s protections because of her inability 
to delineate a convoluted legal concept.”81  The “exact delineation” 
standard does not weed out meritless claims and protect judicial 
efficiency.  Rather, it unfairly disadvantages particular classes of 
asylum seekers whose claims happen to be based on the most 
perplexing and unpredictable ground for asylum. 
2. Prohibiting Revision or Clarification of the PSG at 
the Administrative Level 
The second way that Matter of W-Y-C- restricts PSG-based 
asylum claims is by prohibiting revision of the PSG definition at the 
administrative level.  This new rule conflicts with the BIA’s 
longstanding practice of reviewing revised PSGs, and even revising 
them itself, based on an existing evidentiary record.82  In Matter of 
W-Y-C-, the BIA reasoned its role as an appellate body that cannot 
make factual findings in the first instance prevented it from 
reviewing a revised PSG, explaining that “[a] determination 
whether a social group is cognizable is a fact-based inquiry” and 
stressing the “inherently factual nature of the social group 
analysis.”83  At the same time, however, the BIA acknowledged that 
it “review[s] the ultimate determination whether a proposed group 
is cognizable de novo.”84  Federal appellate court decisions confirm 
that the question of whether a PSG is cognizable is a legal question 
that the BIA reviews de novo.85  Yet the subsidiary elements of 
 
        80 Cantarero-Lagos v. Barr, 2019 WL 1986920 at *6 (5th Cir. 2019) (Dennis, J., 
concurring). 
        81 Id. 
 82 See generally Matter of Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357 (BIA 1996) (allowing both 
parties to reform on appeal). 
 83 Matter of W-Y-C-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 189, 191 (BIA 2018) (quoting Matter of L-E-
A-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 40, 42 (BIA 2017)). 
 84 Id. 
 85 See, e.g., Hernandez-De La Cruz v. Lynch, 819 F.3d 784, 786 (5th Cir. 2016) 
(“Petitioner’s challenge to the determination that ‘former informants’ do not constitute a 
‘particular social group’ is a legal question that we have jurisdiction to review”); Hongyok 
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immutability, social distinction, and particularity, as well as 
membership in the group and nexus (the connection between the 
PSG and the persecution), are all factual findings. 
The question then becomes whether the BIA can determine 
whether a PSG is cognizable when an IJ has not made the subsidiary 
findings about the PSG.  The Eighth Circuit recently explained that 
while immutability, particularity, and social distinction are 
necessary elements to a particular social group, the analysis “does 
not require the immigration judge to make findings on each 
element.”86  There, the IJ rejected the PSG without addressing any 
of the specific elements.87  Despite having no findings on these 
elements from the IJ, the BIA ruled that the PSG lacked 
particularity.88  In that case, the BIA was able to assess particularity 
on its own, and the Eighth Circuit denied Mayorga-Rosa’s petition 
for review.89  If the BIA does not need to review factual findings 
made by the IJ on each of the elements, then it should be able to 
determine if a reformulated PSG is cognizable de novo based on an 
existing record. 
Additionally, if the original PSG presented to the IJ and the 
revised PSG presented to the BIA are substantially similar, then the 
IJ’s findings on the subsidiary elements may apply equally to the 
revised PSG.  This raises the potentially tricky question of how to 
determine whether two groups are substantially similar.  In the case 
of W-Y-C-, the BIA found that the two groups were not substantially 
similar.90  There, the original PSG presented to the IJ was “[s]ingle 
Honduran women, age 14 to 30 who are victims of sexual abuse 
 
v. Gonzales, 492 F.3d 547, 550 (5th Cir. 2007) (“We need not and do not address the BIA’s 
legal conclusion that escaped sex slaves are not a protected social group . . . .”); Matter of 
A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 390 (BIA 2014) (“The question whether a group is a 
‘particular social group’ within the meaning of the Act is a question of law that we review 
de novo.”); Ngugi v. Lynch, 826 F.3d 1132, 1137–39 (8th Cir. 2016); Paloka v. Holder, 
762 F.3d 191, 195 (2d Cir. 2014); Cece v. Holder, 733 F.3d 662, 668 (7th Cir. 2013) (en 
banc); Ayala v. Holder, 640 F.3d 1095, 1096 (9th Cir. 2011); Castañeda-Castillo v. Holder, 
638 F.3d 354, 362 (1st Cir. 2011); Cruz-Funes v. Gonzales, 406 F.3d 1187, 1191 (10th 
Cir. 2005). 
 86 Mayorga-Rosa v. Session, 888 F.3d 379, 383 (8th Cir. 2018). 
 87 See generally id. (rejecting PSG overlooking specific elements). 
 88 Id. at 384. 
 89 See id. at 384–85. 
 90 See Matter of W-Y-C-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 189, 192 (BIA 2018) (“social group is 
substantially different from the one delineated below.”). 
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within the family and whom the government fails to protect.”91  The 
group presented to the BIA was “Honduran women and girls who 
cannot sever their family ties.”92  At first glance, these groups may 
seem quite different, but they both share the immutable 
characteristics of gender, family ties, childhood status, and 
nationality.  Moreover, “lack of government protection for women 
in Honduras is what makes it so difficult for women to sever family 
ties.”93  Nevertheless, the BIA found that they were not substantially 
similar.94  Since neither the BIA nor any appellate court has set forth 
a test for determining whether two groups are substantially similar, 
the determination can be a very subjective analysis that leaves much 
to the BIA’s discretion.  A more objective test would be whether the 
BIA can determine if a PSG is cognizable based on the existing 
evidentiary record. 
Numerous cases show a longstanding practice of allowing 
asylum seekers to reformulate their groups, not only at the 
administrative level in an appeal to the BIA, but even at the circuit 
court level.95  The BIA and federal courts have frequently 
considered these reformulated groups as long as they can analyze 
them based on the existing record.  For example, in Matter of 
Kasinga, an en banc decision on female genital mutilation, the BIA 
allowed both parties to reformulate the PSG on appeal, and then 
ultimately adopted its own definition of the PSG.96  There, the IJ 
analyzed “all tribal women from certain northern tribes” as the 
 
 91 Id. at 189. 
 92 Id. at 190. 
 93 Opening Brief for Petitioners at 25, Petitioners v. Sessions, (No. 18 -60115) 
(challenging Matter of W-Y-C- and H-O-B-). 
 94 See Matter of W-Y-C-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 192. 
 95 See Hongyok v. Gonzales, 492 F.3d 547, 550 (showing reformulation at the circuit 
court level, allowing “semantic” revisions to the social group in a circuit court appeal); 
Calel-Chitic v. Holder, 333 F. App’x 845, 847 (5th Cir. 2009) (allowing the petitioner to 
proceed with a particular social group claim in his Fifth Circuit appeal even though he had 
never articulated a social group in immigration court); see also Sanchez-Robles v. Lynch, 
808 F.3d 688, 692 (6th Cir. 2015) (considering but ultimately rejecting a reformulated 
social group); Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 502 F.3d 285, 290  n.3 (3d Cir. 
2007) (reformulating the social group by omitting part of the original definition); 
Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1094 (9th Cir. 2000) (redefining the social 
group as gay men with “female sexual identities”); Lwin v. I.N.S., 144 F.3d 505, 512 (7th 
Cir. 1998) (refining the social group to be “parents of Burmese student dissidents”). 
 96 Matter of Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 365 (BIA 1996). 
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PSG.97  Before the BIA, Kasinga proposed a PSG defined as 
“[Y]oung women of the Tchamba-Kusuntu tribe who are opposed 
to the tribal practices of FGM and forced polygamous marriages, 
and have no protection against it.”98  The INS proposed a PSG 
defined as “Young women of the Tchamba Kunsuntu tribe who are 
opposed to FGM.”99  The BIA ultimately adopted its own PSG, 
defined as “young women of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe who 
have not had FGM, as practiced by that tribe, and who oppose the 
practice.”100 
 In Matter of M-E-V-G-, another important case that defined 
the “social distinction” and” particularity” requirements for a PSG, 
the BIA remanded the case for further fact-finding, in part because 
“the respondent’s proposed particular social group has evolved 
during the pendency of his appeal.”101  Most recently, in Matter of 
A-B-, the Attorney General himself reformulated the social group.102  
There, the applicant had defined the group as “El Salvadoran 
women who are unable to leave their domestic relationships where 
they have children in common.”103  Yet the Attorney General’s 
decision addressed “whether, and under what circumstances, being 
a victim of a private criminal activity constitutes persecution on 
account of membership in a particular social group.”104  Allowing 
the Attorney General, but not an asylum seeker, to reformulate a 
PSG shows that different rules are being applied to the government 
and to litigants.  This violates the basic principle that the 
government must be held to the same standards as any other litigant 
to ensure a fair proceeding.105 
Federal court precedents further demonstrate that the BIA 
previously allowed reformulation of the PSG at the administrative 
 
 97 See Matter of Kasinga, File No. A73476695 12 (U.S. Dep’t of Justice 1995). 
 98 Resp’t Br. at 31, Matter of Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 365. 
 99 Id.   
 100 Id. 
 101 See Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208, 252 (BIA 2014). 
 102 See Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018). 
 103 Id. at 343. 
 104 Id. at 325. 
 105 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 (the Government as a litigant in a denaturalization proceeding 
is bound by the same rules which apply to all other litigant); U.S. v. Stinson, 197 U.S. 200, 
205 (1905) (“The government is subjected to the same rules respecting the burden of proof, 
the quantity and character of evidence, the presumptions of law and fact, that attend the 
prosecution of a like action by an individual.”). 
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level.  In De Abarca, the First Circuit noted that the IJ had 
considered the PSG defined as “mothers of individuals who resist 
gang activity,” but the BIA redefined group as “nuclear family” and 
analyzed the redefined group.106  In Pirir-Boc, the Ninth Circuit 
noted that the Board had changed the applicant’s articulation of the 
PSG from “persons taking concrete steps to oppose gang 
membership and gang authority” to “those who have taken direct 
action to oppose criminal gangs.”107  In Paloka, the Second Circuit 
explained that the petitioner had presented three different PSGs to 
IJ and merged them into one PSG on appeal to the BIA; she also 
refined her PSG on appeal.108  In Pedromo, the court noted that the 
original PSG was “women between the ages of 14 and 40 who are 
Guatemalan and live in the US,” but the BIA considered a 
reformulated PSG of “all women in Guatemala.”109  And in Cece, 
the Seventh Circuit stressed that even though “the description of 
[the petitioner’s] social group varied from one iteration to the next,” 
these “inconsistencies . . . do not upset the claim.”110 
In some cases, the BIA considered PSGs that were dramatically 
different from those presented to the IJ.  For example, in 
Hernandez-Navarro, the initial PSG was “individuals in fear of the 
violence and gangs in Mexico,” but the PSG presented to the BIA 
was “family in Mexico.”111  In Hernandez-Morales, the Sixth 
Circuit noted that the BIA had reformulated the PSG from 
“individuals enrolled in school in Guatemala who are tall or have a 
muscular build so as to command respect resulting in their 
recruitment by gangs for their capacity to sell drugs” to “young male 
 
 106 De Abarca v. Holder, 757 F.3d 334, 336 (1st Cir. 2014); see also Cardona v. 
Sessions, 848 F.3d 519, 520–21 (1st Cir. 2017) (recognizing that the petitioner may change 
the definitions of particular social groups between the immigration court and appeal to the 
BIA). 
 107 Pirir-Boc v. Holder, 750 F.3d 1077, 1080 1081 (9th Cir. 2014) (noting that the 
BIA changed the applicant’s articulation of his particular social group). 
 108 Paloka v. Holder, 762 F.3d 191, 198–99 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 109 Pedromo v. Holder, 611 F.3d 662, 665 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 110 Cece originally proposed the PSG “young Orthodox women living alone in 
Albania.” The IJ changed it to “young women who are targeted for prostitution by 
traffickers in Albania. The IJ then revised it a second time to “women in danger of being 
trafficked as prostitutes.” After remand, the IJ revised the PSG a third time to “a young 
woman from a minority religion who has lived by herself most of the time in Albania, and 
thus is vulnerable, particularly vulnerable to traffickers for this reason.” Cece v. Holder, 
733 F.3d 662, 670–71 (7th Cir. 2013). 
 111 Hernandez-Navarro, 605 F. App’x 419, 419–20 (5th Cir. 2015). 
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evangelicals.”112  Indeed, there are even cases where the applicant 
never defined the PSG before the IJ, yet the BIA considered a PSG 
defined for the first time in the administrative appeal.113 
These cases indicate that the BIA’s claim in W-Y-C-—that it 
lacks the authority to consider a revised PSG—is disingenuous; the 
BIA has been doing precisely that for decades.  Appellate bodies of 
all kinds routinely make legal determinations based on an existing 
factual record.  Since the question of whether a PSG is cognizable 
is a legal determination, the BIA should be able to address it based 
on the existing record. 
The complexity of the PSG determination, discussed above, 
makes it unreasonable to expect litigants to come up with the perfect 
definition of the PSG themselves, especially if they are 
unrepresented.  The vast majority of asylum seekers are detained, 
and detained asylum seekers are unlikely to obtain representation.114  
A nationwide study of deportation cases found that only 14% of 
detained respondents were represented between 2007 and 2012.115  
The same study concluded that represented detainees are over ten 
times as likely as unrepresented detainees to succeed on the merits 
in immigration court.116  Unrepresented detainees have limited 
options to pursue their case as law libraries in detention centers 
often lack accessible materials, there are language and literacy 
barriers, and access to mail and the internet are limited.117  Given 
these limitations, imposing an “exact delineation” pleading 
 
 112 Hernandez-Morales v. Sessions, 729 F. App’x 443, 444–45 (6th Cir. 2018). 
 113 See Chen v. Holder, 448 F. App’x 610, 611 (7th Cir. 2011) (noting that the 
petitioner had never defined his particular social group before the IJ and then argued that 
he was being persecuted for being a ‘government cooperator’” before the BIA). 
 114 The Trump Administration is expanding the use of immigration detention, 
including for asylum seekers. HARV. IMMIGR. AND REFUGEE CLINICAL PROGRAM, THE 
IMPACT OF PRESIDENT TRUMP’S EXECUTIVE ORDERS ON ASYLUM SEEKERS 1 (2017) (noting 
that in 2014, 77% of all asylum seekers in removal proceedings were held in detention); 
Miriam Jordan, Court Blocks Trump Administration from Blanket Detention of Asylum 
Seekers, N.Y. TIMES (July 2, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/02/us/asylum-
court-ruling-detention.html [https://perma.cc/UQ2Z-GWJK]. 
 115 Ingrid V. Eagly & Steven Shafer, A National Study of Access to Counsel in 
Immigration Court, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 32 (2015). 
 116 Id. at 49. 
 117 See U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS (USCCR), WITH LIBERTY AND JUSTICE FOR 
ALL: THE STATE OF CIVIL RIGHTS AT IMMIGRATION DETENTION FACILITIES 42 (2015), 
https://www.usccr.gov/pubs/docs/Statutory_Enforcement_Report2015.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/WX5Z-W67R]. 
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requirement on asylum seekers pursuing the PSG ground, and 
prohibiting clarification or revision of the PSG in an administrative 
appeal, makes little sense. 
B. Substantive Constrictions 
Not long after the BIA’s decision in Matter of W-Y-C- imposed 
the significant procedural limitations on the PSG ground discussed 
above, the Attorney General’s decision in Matter of A-B- created 
two more substantial obstacles.  These include restricting entire 
categories of PSG claims and imposing a heightened legal standard 
for persecution by non-governmental actors 
1. Restricting Entire Categories of PSG Claims 
The Attorney General’s decision in Matter of A-B- discounts 
domestic violence as a valid basis for asylum, along with any cases 
involving “gang violence.”118  Additionally, the BIA’s decision in 
Matter of L-E-A-, which is currently pending review by the Attorney 
General, limits family-based asylum claims.119  This section 
examines how these decisions limit domestic violence and family-
based asylum claims, which uniquely impact women asylum 
seekers. 
a. Domestic Violence Related PSG Claims 
One of the biggest substantive changes in the area of PSG-based 
asylum claims in recent years was former Attorney General 
Sessions’s decision to overrule Matter of A-R-C-G-, the only BIA 
precedent recognizing a PSG in an asylum case involving domestic 
violence.120  As noted above, in Matter of A-R-C-G-, the PSG that 
the BIA accepted was “married Guatemalan women who are unable 
to leave the relationship.”121  Subsequently, in unpublished 
decisions, IJs and the BIA recognized similar groups involving 
unmarried women abused by their partners, as well as children 
abused by family members.122  Between 2014 and 2018, numerous 
women and children were granted asylum in cases involving 
 
 118 See Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 335 (A.G. 2018). 
 119 See Matter of L-E-A-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 40, 44–45 (BIA 2017); Matter of L-E-A-, 
27 I. & N. Dec. 494, 494 (A.G. 2018). 
 120 See Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 317. 
 121 Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 389 (BIA 2014). 
 122 Id. 
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domestic violence.123 
However, in Matter of A-B- the Attorney General overruled 
Matter of A-R-C-G-, finding that the BIA’s explanation of how the 
proposed PSG satisfied the criteria of social distinction and 
particularity was not well reasoned.124  Critically, Matter of A-B- 
states that “[g]enerally, claims by aliens pertaining to domestic 
violence or gang violence perpetrated by non-governmental actors 
will not qualify for asylum.”125  This near-blanket rule purports to 
exclude entire categories of asylum claims without any 
individualized assessment of the facts and circumstances.  That 
approach conflicts with the longstanding requirement for 
individualized determinations of asylum applications.126  In Grace 
v. Whitaker, the D.C. District Court rejected this general rule against 
asylum claims based on domestic violence and gang violence as 
arbitrary and capricious in the context of credible fear interviews.127  
The same reasoning supports rejecting the near-blanket rule in 
removal proceedings. 
b. Family-Related PSG Claims 
Another entire category of PSG claims that appears to be under 
attack are those based on family.  The BIA has long recognized that 
family membership may establish a particular social group.  This 
line of cases dates at least as far back as 1985, when Matter of 
Acosta mentioned “kinship ties” as an example of an immutable 
characteristic that can define a PSG.128  In recent years, however, 
the BIA has limited the use of family as a PSG. 
In 2008, the BIA held in Matter of S-E-G- that a group 
comprised of “‘family members,’ which could include fathers, 
mothers, siblings, uncles, aunts, nieces, nephews, grandparents, 
[and] cousins” of “Salvadoran youth who have been subjected to 
recruitment efforts by MS-13 and who have rejected or resisted 
membership in the gang” is too amorphous to constitute a 
 
 123 See Blaine Bookey, Gender-Based Asylum Post Matter of A-R-C-G-: Evolving 
Standards and Fair Application of the Law, 22 SW. J. INT’L L. 1, 3–9 (2016). 
 124 See Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 317. 
 125 Id. at 320. 
 126 See Blaine Bookey, Gender-Based Asylum Post Matter of A-R-C-G-: Evolving 
Standards and Fair Application of the Law, 22 SOUTHWESTERN J. INT’L L. 1, 8 (2016). 
 127 Grace v. Whitaker, 344 F. Supp. 3d 96, 126–27 (D.C. 2018). 
 128 See Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211 (BIA 1985). 
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cognizable particular social group.129 
More recently, in 2017, the BIA issued Matter of L-E-A-, a 
decision that recognized the longstanding precedents recognizing 
family as a PSG but went on to stress that “[n]ot all social groups 
that involve family members meet the requirements of particularity 
and social distinction.”130  The BIA “agree[d] with the DHS’s 
argument that the inquiry in a claim based on family membership 
will depend on the degree of the relationships involved and how 
those relationships are regarded by the society in question.”131 
In Matter of L-E-A-, the BIA concluded the proposed family 
qualified as a PSG but affirmed the denial of asylum on the basis 
that the applicant had failed to show that his family membership was 
at least one central reason for the persecution.132  The BIA explained 
that a nexus “often arise[s] in cases where the family status is 
connected to another protected ground, particularly where there is a 
political motive . . . that it intertwined with or underlies the 
dispute.”133  The BIA also reasoned that “the fact that a persecutor 
targets a family member simply as a means to an end is not by itself, 
sufficient to establish a claim, especially if the end is not connected 
to another protected ground.”134  This “means to an end” test is 
much more restrictive than a simple “but for” test (i.e. the asylum 
seeker would not have been targeted but for the familial 
relationship).  The “means to an end” test will likely result in the 
denial of many family-based claims brought by individuals fleeing 
Mexico and Central America.  In that context, it is easy for 
immigration judges to conclude that gangs and cartels threaten 
family members in order to obtain extortion or ransom, to increase 
their ranks, or to avoid arrest, all of which may be characterized as 
a means to an end.135 
While the BIA’s decision did not go so far as to hold that family-
based asylum claims require another protected ground to be 
 
 129 Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 585 (BIA 2008). 
 130 Matter of L-E-A-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 40, 42–43 (BIA 2017). 
 131 Id. at 43. 
 132 Id. at 47. 
 133 Id. at 45. 
 134 Id. 
 135 See Jeffrey S. Chase, Matter of L-E-A-:The BIA’s Missed Opportunity, 
JEFFREYSCHASE.COM (June 22, 2017), 
https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2017/6/11/matter-of-l-e-a-the-bias-missed-
opportunity [https://perma.cc/K23D-QM95]. 
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involved (i.e. a “double nexus”)—a highly controversial issue—it 
suggests that family-based claims are strongest in that situation.  A 
double nexus would require the applicant to show not only that she 
was targeted on account of a family relationship (the PSG) but also 
that the family member whose relationship created the risk to the 
applicant was targeted on account of a separate protected ground. 
In December 2018, Acting Attorney General Whitaker directed 
the BIA to refer him Matter of L-E-A- for review of the decision.136  
Whitaker stayed the BIA’s decision in Matter of L-E-A- and 
requested briefing on “[w]hether, and under what circumstances, an 
alien may establish persecution on account of a membership in a 
‘particular social group’ . . . based on the aliens’ membership in a 
family unit.”137  This phrasing suggests that the Acting Attorney 
General was considering whether family may ever be the basis of a 
PSG.  It is very likely that Whitaker certified the decision to himself 
in order to reconsider the double nexus issue.  Whitaker has since 
been replaced by William Barr as Attorney General,138 but the 
future of family-based asylum claims remains uncertain. 
2. Applying a Heightened Standard for Persecution by 
Non-Governmental Actors 
The second substantive change imposed by Matter of A-B- is a 
heightened standard for persecution by non-governmental actors.  
Although this standard applies to all of the protected grounds, not 
just the PSG ground, it uniquely impacts the PSG ground because 
cases involving gender-related harm by private actors are often 
brought under that ground.139 
 
 136 Matter of L-E-A-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 494. 
 137 Id. at 494. 
 138 Attorneys General of the United States, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., 
https://www.justice.gov/ag/historical-bios [https://perma.cc/3VMW-63M6]. 
 139 See Linda Kelly, “On Account of” Private Violence: The Personal/Political 
Dichotomy of Asylum’s Nexus, 21 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 98 (2017) (explaining 
that the PSG ground provides “terrific new opportunities for personal violence victims” 
but “such optimism is checked by high standards”); Nina Rabin, At the Border between 
Public and Private: U.S. Immigration Policy for Victims of Domestic Violence, 7 L. & 
ETHICS HUM. RTS. 109, 109 (2013); Marisa Silenzi Cianciarulo, Batters as Agents of the 
State: Challenging the Public/Private Distinction in Intimate Partner Violence-Based 
Asylum Claims, 35 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 117, 117 (2013); Hilary Charlesworth, Christine 
Chinkin & Shelly Wright, Feminist Approaches to International Law, 85 AM. J. INT’L L. 
613, 613 (discussing “a public/private dichotomy based on gender”); Karen Musalo and 
Blaine Bokey, Crimes Without Punishment: An Update on Violence Against Women and 
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Under the INA, a noncitizen must show either “past persecution 
or a well-founded fear of future persecution” to qualify for 
asylum.140  In Matter of Acosta, the BIA recognized that persecution 
could be inflicted “either by the government of a country or by 
persons or an organization that the government was unable or 
unwilling to control.”141  The BIA explained that statutes predating 
the Refugee Act of 1980 used the term “persecution,” and that it 
already had a well-settled judicial and administrative meaning of 
“harm or suffering . . . inflicted either by the government of a 
country or by persons or an organization that the government was 
unable or unwilling to control.”142  The BIA therefore construed the 
INA as carrying forward the same established meaning of the 
term.143  Consistent with the BIA’s interpretation in Acosta, the 
UNHCR Handbook recognizes that persecution includes “serious 
discriminatory or other offensive acts . . . committed by the local 
populace . . . if they are knowingly tolerated by the authorities, or if 
the authorities refuse, or prove unable, to 
offer effective protection.”144 
Yet, in Matter of A-B-, the Attorney General imposed a stricter 
standard for persecution by non-governmental actors, requiring the 
applicant to show that “the government condoned the private 
actions or at least demonstrated a complete helplessness to protect 
the victim.”145  Under this heightened standard, no asylum seeker 
who received assistance from the government, regardless of how 
ineffective that assistance was, could meet the persecution 
requirement when the persecutor is a non-government actor.146   
That interpretation conflicts with numerous appellate court 
precedents,147 and, in Grace v. Whitaker, which addressed credible 
 
Impunity in Guatemala, 10 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 265, 265 (2013); Deborah 
Anker, Lauren Gilbert & Nancy Kelly, Women Whose Governments Are Unable or 
Unwilling to Provide Reasonable Protection from Domestic Violence May Qualify as 
Refugees Under United States Asylum Law, 11 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 709, 709 (1997). 
 140 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2012). 
 141 Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 222 (BIA 1985). 
 142 Id. 
 143 Id. at 223. 
 144 UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 51, at 65. 
 145 Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 337 (A.G. 2018) (emphasis added). 
 146 See Grace v. Whitaker, 344 F. Supp. 3d 96, 129 (D.C. 2018).  
 147 See, e.g., Rosales Justo v. Sessions, 895 F.3d 154, 159 (1st Cir. 2018) (holding that 
a petitioner satisfied the “unable or unwilling” standard, even though there was a 
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fear interviews, the D.C. District Court found that it is “simply not 
the law.”148  To the extent some appellate courts have used the 
“condoned” or “complete helplessness” language utilized in Matter 
of A-B-, Grace explains that those courts actually applied the 
“unable or unwilling” standard despite using different language.149  
Reasoning that the “unable or unwilling” standard for non-
governmental persecution was settled at the time the Refuge Act of 
1980 was codified in the INA, Grace concluded that the “condoned” 
or “complete helplessness” standard in A-B- is not a permissible 
construction of persecution.150   
Because the decision in Grace pertains specifically to credible 
fear interviews, it has no direct impact on cases pending before the 
immigration courts or BIA.  Thus, immigration courts can continue 
to apply the heightened standard in A-B- in removal proceedings.  
However, the logic of Grace applies equally to asylum cases in 
removal proceedings, as well as to affirmative asylum applications 
submitted to U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services by 
individuals who are not facing deportation.  Immigration judges 
who apply the heightened standard in A-B- will likely be challenged 
on appeal, and the circuit courts that receive those appeals will 
ultimately need to address the same issue addressed by Grace. 
IV. Implications of Constricting the PSG Ground 
The recent developments discussed above have serious 
implications for the future of asylum claims based on the PSG 
ground.  These changes appear targeted at the current populations 
fleeing Central America.  Policies calling for a “border wall” and 
stopping migration from Mexico and Central America go hand-in-
hand with these administrative decisions making it harder for people 
escaping those countries to obtain asylum in the United States.151  
But the procedural and substantive changes created by Matter of W-
Y-C- and Matter of A-B- will impact all asylum claims based on the 
 
significant police response to the claimed persecution). 
 148 Grace v. Whitaker, 344 F.Supp. 3d at 129. 
 149 Id. (discussing Galina v. INS, 213 F.3d 955, 955 (7th Cir. 2000)). 
 150 Id. at 130. 
 151 See Robert Moore, Border Agents Are Using a New Weapon Against Asylum 
Seekers, TEX. MONTHLY (June 2, 2018), 
https://www.texasmonthly.com/politics/immigrant-advocates-question-legality-of-latest-
federal-tactics/ [https://perma.cc/X9MV-AHCG]. 
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PSG ground. 
In the short term, we are likely to see much higher rates of denial 
of asylum claims related to domestic violence, which had become 
accepted under Matter of A-R-C-G-, as well as higher rates of 
denials in cases involving family-based PSGs, which have been 
accepted for decades.  We are also likely to see a proliferation of 
appeals challenging these new procedural and substantive rules in 
the circuit courts, similar to what occurred when the BIA introduced 
the social visibility distinction and particularity requirements.   
One key difference, however, is that the new procedural rules in 
Matter of W-Y-C- should not be subject to Chevron deference.  
While the BIA’s decisions addressing social visibility/distinction 
and particularity were interpreting the term “particular social group” 
in the INA, the procedural rules announced in Matter of W-Y-C- do 
not involve statutory interpretation.  The BIA is not interpreting the 
meaning of a PSG in W-Y-C-; it is adopting procedural rules that are 
completely independent of the statute.  The appellate courts should 
review these new procedural rules de novo, which makes them 
much easier to overturn than under the deferential Chevron test. 
The substantive changes created by Matter of A-B- and, 
depending on the ultimate decision by the Attorney General, Matter 
of L-E-A-, on the other hand, do interpret terms in the INA 
(“particular social group” and “persecution”) and should therefore 
be reviewed under Chevron.  Nevertheless, they may well fail that 
standard as arbitrary or unreasonable interpretations of the INA.  
The D.C. District Court’s decision in Grace provides compelling 
rationale for rejecting any type of blanket exclusion of entire 
categories of claims and a heightened standard for persecution by 
non-governmental actors under step two of Chevron.  It is also quite 
possible that a circuit split will emerge on these issues, just as 
occurred with respect to the social distinction and particularity 
requirements.  As the PSG analysis becomes increasingly complex 
and produces such circuit splits, it will continue to undermine the 
uniform and consistent application of asylum law. 
This discussion also requires highlighting and contextualizing 
the unique impact of the procedural and substantive changes 
explained above on gender-related asylum claims.  These recent 
cases reveal how gender-related asylum claims are being suppressed 
in the United States at the same time that the “me too” movement 
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has exploded worldwide.152  In fact, Matter of A-B- injects 
antiquated notions of domestic violence as “private violence” back 
into asylum jurisprudence.153  Describing domestic violence as 
“private violence” is wrong for many reasons.154  Scholars such as 
Kimberlé Crenshaw have demonstrated how the convergences 
between private and public power create intersectional dimensions 
of social control.155  Government actors are often complicit in 
private violence, allowing public and private forces to work 
symbiotically.156  The inadequate response of police to domestic 
violence exemplifies this type of symbiosis.157  Additionally, 
government actors participate in creating social constructions of 
“private life” as something distinct from the public sphere.158  For 
all of these reasons, the concept of state responsibility in 
international human rights law, which includes refugee law, has 
evolved to include obligations to prevent, investigate, and punish 
abuses by private actors.159  Attempting to isolate “private violence” 
from state action undermines decades of work to show how the 
public and private sphere are intertwined and risks forfeiting our 
international obligations. 
On the other hand, it is possible that by overruling Matter of A-
R-C-G- and the complicated definition of the PSG that the BIA 
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accepted in that case (“married women who are unable to leave the 
relationship”), former Attorney General Sessions unintentionally 
made some immigration judges more open to consider a much 
simpler, more logical version of the PSG that has long been 
advocated by immigration lawyers and scholars: women.160  In at 
least three asylum decisions issued after Matter of A-B-, 
immigration judges in Philadelphia, San Francisco, and Arlington 
have done just that, finding that gender alone defined the PSG.161  
Gender or sex is an immutable characteristic, similar to race, 
religion, nationality and political opinion, and also satisfies the 
requirements of social distinction and particularity.   
In the past, many judges have rejected PSGs defined solely 
based on gender or sex out of fear of opening the floodgates. But 
fear of opening the floodgates is not a legal reason to reject a PSG.  
That fear is also unfounded, since establishing a PSG is just one of 
several requirements to qualify for asylum.162  The other elements 
an applicant needs to show include a well-founded fear of severe 
harm that rises to the level of persecution, a nexus between the 
persecution and the PSG, and, in cases involving nongovernmental 
persecutors, that the government is unable or unwilling to provide 
protection.163  Thus, merely accepting a PSG defined solely by sex 
or gender would not render all women fleeing a given country 
eligible for asylum. 
The most troubling implication of W-Y-C- is the risk to due 
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process posed by pretermitting asylum cases without giving 
applicants the opportunity for an evidentiary hearing. All 
noncitizens have a fundamental right to procedural due process in 
removal proceedings, which requires a full and fair hearing.164  
Noncitizens have due process (and statutory) rights to testify, 
present witnesses and documentary evidence, and cross-examine 
any witnesses presented by the government.165  Pretermitting 
applications based on the failure to provide an “exact delineation” 
of the PSG undermines these rights.  While there may be cases 
where pretermitting an application for asylum is appropriate 
because the person is clearly ineligible for that form of relief (for 
example, where the noncitizen is statutorily barred from asylum 
based on an aggravated felony conviction), the proper definition of 
the PSG may only emerge after all the evidence is presented, 
including testimony.  Thus, pretermitting an asylum case based on 
failing to define the PSG perfectly at an early stage of the 
proceedings is a dangerous approach. 
One of the biggest challenges noncitizens will face when 
appealing decisions to pretermit their applications is proving 
prejudice from the due process violation.  Some circuit courts have 
an especially high standard for establishing prejudice, which 
requires showing that the outcome of the proceedings would have 
been different, not just that they may have been different, if the due 
process violation had not occurred.166  Even circuit courts that have 
applied a more lenient prejudice standard have previously denied 
due process challenges brought by noncitizens when immigration 
judges pretermitted cases without a full evidentiary hearing based 
on the failure to demonstrate prejudice.167  There are some cases, 
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however, where courts have found a violation of due process that 
resulted in prejudice, stemming from the IJ’s decision to pretermit 
an application.  For example, in one unpublished case, the Third 
Circuit found that an IJ’s refusal to allow an applicant for 
cancellation of removal to present additional evidence violated due 
process, resulting in prejudice.168  In that case, the noncitizen 
actually had an opportunity to testify at a hearing but was denied an 
opportunity to present additional evidence at a subsequent hearing 
to clarify ambiguity in his prior testimony.169  In cases where the 
noncitizen is deprived of any opportunity to testify, the due process 
concerns are even greater. 
Another complication in bringing due process challenges where 
IJs have pretermitted asylum cases is that some courts have found 
there is no due process interest in discretionary forms of relief, and 
asylum is ultimately discretionary.  Courts have been inconsistent 
in their approach to this issue.  For instance, the Third Circuit found 
a due process violation in the case mentioned above, even though 
cancellation of removal is discretionary, but in other cases, the Third 
Circuit has held there is no constitutionally protected due process 
interest in discretionary forms of relief like cancellation of 
removal.170  However, other courts have reasoned that even though 
discretionary relief such as asylum is not a protected liberty interest, 
due process principles apply because noncitizens in removal 
proceedings are entitled to a full and fair hearing.171 
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V. Conclusion 
The recent developments in PSG jurisprudence discussed above 
further distance the United States’ interpretation of the PSG ground 
from UNHCR’s authoritative interpretations of the Refugee 
Convention and Protocol.  This backwards slide undercuts the 
fundamental human rights protections that these treaties aim to 
provide and injects ever greater inconsistencies and uncertainty into 
our asylum system. 
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